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ABSTRACT
Extending the seminal work of Bhagwati and Hansen (1973) on
smuggling, Pitt (1981) developed a new approach to investigate
the welfare effect of smuggling.

This paper develops an

extension of Pitt's original model which allows many of the
interesting features of the Bhagwati and Hansen model to be
revaluated within a joint product model of smuggling framework.
The extension is made through the following modifications to
Pitt's assumptions: 1) firms that export are free to engage in
joint product smuggling or strictly legal trade; and 2)
uncertainty is introduced into the model via active government
enforcement.
The modifications enable the model to reexamine the
ambiguous welfare results derived in the papers by Pitt, and
Bhagwati and Hansen.

The model explains why the ambiguous

welfare results were derived and demonstrates that the welfare
effect of smuggling can indeed be positive, even if smuggling
incurs a real resource cost.

I wish to thank Don Coes, Bob Gillespie, Earl Grinols and
Chuck Lamberton for their comments on the issues discussed in
this paper. Any remaining errors are my responsibility.
1

2

All correspondence should be directed to Asst. Prof Scott
Fausti, Department of Economics, South Dakota State
University, Scobey Hall Box 504A, Brookings, SD 57007

I. Introduction.
The paper by Pitt (1981} on illegal transactions in
international trade questioned the results of the seminal paper
on illegal transactions by Bhagwati and Hansen (1973). The
purpose of this paper is to explore how Pitt's welfare results
are affected when risk and the firm's attitude toward risk are
introduced in conjunction with the firm's freedom to choose
between strictly legal trade and joint product smuggling. The
modified model of joint product smuggling developed in this paper
permits many of the essential features of the Bhagwati and Hansen
model to be incorporated into the analysis.

This is accomplished

by developing the role of government enforcement within the crime
theoretic framework for the analysis of joint product
smuggling. 1
In this essay Pitt's model of joint product export smuggling
is modified to incorporate aptive government enforcement of
smuggling laws; thereby introducing uncertainty. The model
develops a decision mechanism which determines whether the firm
will smuggle.

The firm's attitude toward risk affects this

decision process.

The model requires the smuggling firm to

include the real resource costs of smuggling and expected
These two factors affect

punishment in its output price.

production and output price if the firm smuggles.

The firm's

smuggling decision determines the long run equilibrium domestic
Martin and Panagariya (1984) were the first to introduce
the crime theoretic approach to the analysis of smuggling.
1
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price ratio.

The results of the model indicate that: 1) it is

the firm's attitude toward risk in conjunction with the real
resource cost of smuggling that determines the welfare effect of
smuggling; 2) if firms are risk neutral or risk averse and they
decide to smuggle, then smuggling is welfare enhancing under
certain conditions; and 3) the assumption of a significant real
resource cost is only a partial explanation for the ambiguous
welfare results found in the earlier smuggling literature. 2
II. Assumptions.
The basic assumptions of Pitt's model of smuggling are the
starting point for this paper.

Pitt assumes the small country

case with the terms of trade fixed.

The country produces two

traded goods, an exportable (X) and an importable (M), employing
primary factors purchased in competitive markets.
trade are carried out by identical firms.

Production and

Legal and illegal

trade in exports is carried out by the same firm.

The law of one

price holds in the domestic economy.
The following additional assumptions are made so that a
model of smuggling incorporating uncertainty can be developed: 1)
firms that smuggle may not incur a significant real smuggling
cost; 3

2) smugglers (firms) are natives and therefore their

utility functions are embodied in the country's social welfare
See Bhagwati and Hansen (1973), Pitt (1980), Martin and
Pangariya (1984), and Sheikh (1989).
2

cooper (1974) and Deardorff and Stopler (1988) argue that
smuggling may not impose any significant real cost on society over
legal trade.
3

2

function; 3) export taxes are assumed to be non-prohibitive; 4)
firms must bear the risk of illegal activity and they cannot
insure against criminal penalties; 5) exporting firms have a
choice between strictly legal trade or smuggling, with the choice
based on profit maximization; and, 6) if the domestic exporting
firm decides to smuggle, it will then produce a joint product,
and legal trade will act as a cloak for the firm's illegal
activity.

The firm can use four methods to smuggle exports: a)

under-invoicing of exports; b) falsely declared exports; c)
under-assessment of exports; and d) clandestine smuggling of
unreported production. 4
I I I. A Joint Product Model of Smuggling.
In addition to the assumptions made in the previous section,
it is assumed each firm can trade illegally according to a
modified Pitt smuggling function,
s*

= G (L, S) .

(1)

The variable (S*) is the quantity of good (X) made ready to
be smuggled. The variable (S*) in this model is defined as
exports made ready for smuggling across the domestic border or,
in other words, smuggling attempted. The variable (L) is the
quantity of good (X) legally traded and (S) is the quantity of
good (X) input into smuggling activity.

The function (G} is

strictly concave and a twice. differentiable linear homogeneous

Deardorff and Stolper (1988} discuss the widespread use of
smuggling method (d) in a number of African countries.
4
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function.
properties:
GL �

o,

1 � G8

GLL
�

The function (G) is assumed to have the following

s o,

(2)

0, Gss S O,

(3)

G (O,S)=O,

(4 )

G (L,O)=O,

(5)

s-s* � o, acs-s*)/aL <o, acs-s*)/as >o.

(6)

Assumption (2) states that the marginal smuggling product of

legal trade used in smuggling is non-negative and is declining in
(L).

Assumption (3) states that a unit increase in the smuggling

input (S) results in a positive but less than unit increase in
actual amount of the export made ready to be smuggled, and the
marginal product of (S) is declining. Assumption (4) states that
legal trade is a necessary input into smuggling or the
Assumption (5) states that

probability of detection is one.

firms can choose to engage in legal trade only.

Assumption (6)

prohibits the real resource cost of smuggling from being
negative. The real resource cost of smuggling

(s-s*) is the

smuggler's selling cost in excess of legal trade selling cost. It
is assumed that the actual magnitude of smuggling's real resource
cost is exogenous to the model. However, a change in one of the
endogenous variables (L) or (S), affects the marginal resource
cost of smuggling.

A one-unit increase in (L), ceteris paribus,

reduces the marginal real resource cost of smuggling.

A one-unit

increase in (S), ceteris paribus, increases the marginal real
resource cost of smuggling.
4

In the literature, smuggling•s ambiguous welfare effect is
the direct result of how the real resource cost assumption is
modeled. 5

A negative welfare effect results from an excessive

real resource cost incurred by smugglers, while an insignificant
real resource cost produces a positive welfare effect.

As an

example, Pitt assumes that the cost of smuggling is composed of
either penalties and confiscation or a mixture of a real resource
cost and penalties and confiscation.

His welfare result is

ambiguous because the composition of the cost mix is unknown.

We

alter Pitt's assumption and assume that the difference between
(S) and (S*) is a real resource cost incurred from the use of
cloaking tactics employed to evade detection. 6
Smuggling is assumed to incur a risk of detection (p) ,
(l�p�O) such that (p=l) if (L=O) .

The expected value of illegal

goods intercepted as they are moved over the border is (p•Pf•S*)
or (Pf •S*) if (L=O) . The variable (Pf) is the world price of
exports. The expected value of successful smuggling is ( (1p) P f•S*].

The variable (F) is a multiple of the value of

intercepted illegal goods which is imposed as a fine, (F�l) .

The

expected cost of interception to the smuggler is (p•F•P f•s*) and
is at least (P f ·S*) if (L=O) . Expected smuggling revenue net of

see Bhagwati and Hansen (1973) , Pitt (1981) , Martin and
Panagariya (1984) , and Sheikh (1989) .
5

6

The real resource cost, for example, may take the form of:
1) special packing cost necessary to hide smuggled goods; and 2)
the transport cost of shipping unreported production out of the
country via clandestine ports.
5

interception cost is equal to [ (1-p·F)·Pf·s*J and is non-positive
if (L=O).
The expected value of output price per unit of smuggled good

at the border for the smuggling firm is E[P5 ] = (1-p·F) .pf, and

is non-positive if (L=O). The expected value of revenue per input
unit of the smuggled good at the border for the smuggling firm is
E (P8]· (S*/S) = (1-p·F) •Pf • (S*/s), and is non-positive if (L=O).
The expected value for the output price per unit of legally
exported goods is E[PL] = pf• (l-t) = pL, and represents the legal
tax distorted price for exports.
export tax.

The variable (t) denotes the

It is assumed the firm knows the values of these

risk factors.
It is assumed each firm has a decision to make. The firm
can engage in joint product smuggling or it can sell its output
at the legal domestic export tax distorted price (PL), as implied
by the assumption G (L, 0)=0. 7

If the firm decides to smuggle, it

receives the weighted average price for its total output.
If the firm decides to become involved in joint product
illegal trade, then its situation can be thought of as a lottery.
The expected value of the lottery is dependent on variables
(p, y•, F).

The probability of apprehension (p) is determined by

the government.

It is assumed the firm's probability of being

caught is (p), if it engages in cloaking activities.

If it does

not cloak its illegal activity, then the probability of
strictly legal trade profits are derived from equation (7)
when it is assumed S=O.
7

6

apprehension is equal to one.

The variable (F} determines the

monetary equivalent of the punishment imposed on the firm by the
government if it is caught in the illegal act of smuggling.
Fines are considered a transfer to the government.

As in Pitt's

paper; profit maximization in production implies producing on the
production possibility curve where the marginal rate of
transformation equals domestic relative prices (P*}.

The

variable (Y 8 ) represents profits from joint product export trade.
Smugglers are assumed to be profit maximizers.

Expected

profit for the smuggling fir� is given by equation (7) ,
E (Y8 ) =Pf•G (L,S) - (p) •F•Pf•G (L,S) + p f. (1-t) •L - P*• (L+S) • 8 (7)
The term [Pf•G (L,S) - (p) ·F·Pf•G (L,S) ] denotes expected

smuggling revenues; p f• (l-t) •L represents revenues for legal
trade.

As in Pitt's article, firms earn zero economic profit in

the long run. Setting equation (7) to zero and solving for p*
generates an expression for the long run equilibrium domestic
price ratio as a weighted average of prices received for goods
legally exported in conjunction with goods illegally exported:
p* = [ (1-p·F) ·Pf• (S*) ]/ (L+S) + [Pf• (l-t) • (L) ]/ (L+S) .

(8)

The exporting firm's decision of whether to engage in strictly
legal trade (S=O) or engage i
. n smuggling and produce a joint
product (L+S*} will determine the long run equilibrium domestic
price ratio (DPR}. If firms smuggle, then Pitt's "price
disparity" result is generated.
8

The first order conditions can be found in appendix (A) .
7

I V. The Role of Uncertainty in the Smuggling Decision.
The act of smuggling incurs a risk. The exporting firm's
attitude toward the risk will effect its decision to smuggle or
engage in strictly legal trade. This section applies the
methodology developed by Arrow (1970) and Pratt (1964) to address
the uncertainty issue in this paper.
Joint product illegal trade profit represents an uncertain
prospect and legal trade profit represents a certain prospect.
The term (fl) represents the difference between the expected value
of illegal profit and legal profit; it follows that there exists
a (fl*) such that the firm is indifferent between legal and
illegal trade.
toward risk.

The value of (fl*) depends on the firm's attitude
Applying Pratt's results we can define (fl*) as a

risk premium and the functional form of (n*) is given in equation
( 9) '

fl/ = (1/2) •VAR (Y) • -{U" (Y) + U' (Y) }.

( 9)

The measure of absolute risk aversion is defined as
-[U" ( Y) /U' ( Y) ], and is employed as the measure of the firm's
attitude toward risk in this section. The following conditions
arise from equation (9) : 1) the value of (n*) for the firm will
be negative if (U">O) ; 2) positive if (U"<O) ; and 3) zero if
(U"=O) .

This implies, respectively, that the firm prefers,

averts, or is neutral toward risk.

In this paper the risk

preferring case is not addressed. The variable {n*) represents
the insurance premium the firm would be willing to pay if it
could insure itself against criminal penalties.
8

Therefore, (n*)

represents the minimum value of risk premium necessary to make
the firm indifferent to smuggling.

This implies that, in

equilibrium, at the margin, smugglers that are risk averse earn

higher profits than in legal activities.

Smugglers who are risk

neutral earn the same amount of profits as in legal trade. 9
Hence, (11'*)

serves as proxy.for Cooper's "threshold of law

abidingness. 1110

Whenever (7l'>7l'*), then the firm will become

involved in smuggling.
In the paper by Sheikh (1989), a positive equilibrium level
of economic profit is considered a "reward" to smugglers who are
risk averse as compensation for the mental anguish incurred by

participating in a risky venture. In this paper, the risk premium
(11'*) represents the smuggler's compensation. As in Sheikh's

paper, there is a unique perfectly competitive equilibrium in
this model where the cost associated with the amount of mental
anguish is exactly equal to the reward for risk (11'*).
Assume the exporting firm reacts to uncertainty as described

above. Long run economic profit is then equal to zero for the
risk neutral firm.

It follows that economic profit is positive

for the risk averse firm. This assumption modifies equation (7)
and long run equilibrium expected profit for the smuggling firm
is:
Becker (1968) used this approach to examine the effect of
uncertainty on criminal behavior.
9

See Cooper (1974), for a discussion of the factors which
influence a firm to smuggle or continue in legal trade, p.186.
10

9

E (Y5) =Pf•G (L,S) - (p) •F•Pf•G (L,S) + pf. (1-t) •L - p*. (L+S) =n*. (10)
Solving equation (10) for P* generates a new expression for the
(DPR) :
p* = [ (1-p•F) . pf. (S*) ]/ (L+S) + [Pf• (1-t) • (L) ]/ (L+ S) -n*/ (L+S) . (11)
Long run equilibrium domestic relative price is now a
function of the weighted average price of joint product
smuggling, which includes the risk premium (n*) .

The firm's

decision to engage in joint product smuggling or strictly legal
trade is determined by the firm's decision criteria condition:
max [P f · (1-t) , pf. (s*+s) • (1-p•F) -n*/S].

(12)

Condition (12) states that if the expected value of revenue per
input unit of smuggled good, less the per unit risk premium, is
greater than the per unit revenue that could be earned by selling
(S) through legal channels, then all firms smuggle and DPR=P*. If

not, then the DPR=PL. The following statements outline the firm's
decision mechanism for engaging in joint product smuggling or the
strictly legal trade alternative:
p f. g*. (1-p•F) - n*

pf. g. (1-t) ,

(13)

if p f· (S*/S) • (1-p•F) -n*/S < p f. (1-t) , then S=O, DPR is pL,

(14)

if pf· (S*/s) • (1-p•F) -n*/s > p f. (1-t) , then S>O, DPR is p*,

(15)

if pf· (s*/s) • (1-p·F) -n*/s = pf. (1-t) ,
then the type of firm activity is indeterminate, pL=P*.

(16)

statement (13) compares total revenue (Pf•S*• (l-p·F) ) coming from
illegal trade minus the risk premium to the total revenue
(Pf•S• (l-t) ) which would be earned by channeling (S) through
legal channels. Statements (14-16) are derived from (13) .
10

Under the assumption of risk neutrality (ff*=O) and a real
cost associated with smuggling (s-s*>o) , the (OPR) is determined
by the firm's decision to smuggle or engage in strictly legal
trade.

The firm's choice is based on the decision criteria found

in statements (14-15) .

Statement (16) reveals the necessary

condition for the coexistence of legal trade only firms (S=O)
with firms that smuggle (joint product exports) . This model,
unlike models in the previous literature, requires the smuggling
firm to account for the real resource cost incurred by smuggling
in the firm's output price structure. However, if the firm
decides to smuggle, welfare may not be enhanced due to the real
resource cost.
The real resource cost of smuggling in this model is equal
to pf• (s-s*) and represents the total welfare loss associated
with smuggling.

The negative welfare effect can be divided into

two parts: 1) a negative effect on prices and therefore
production; and 2) a loss in government revenue.

The negative

price effect (1-p•F) ·P f• (s-s*) is internalized by the smuggling
firm and is reflected in the firm's output price.

The welfare

loss due to a real resource cost not accounted for in the
smuggling firm's output price is the value of lost government
confiscation revenues that would have accrued if (s-s·�o) . The
welfare loss not accounted for by the firm can be considered a
dead weight loss to society . (OWL) and it is equal to:
OWL = (p•F) •Pf• (S-S*) .

(17)
11

The overall welfare effect of smuggling depends on whether
additional revenues accruing to the firm from the act of
smuggling outweigh the negative welfare effect of the dead weight
loss due to the real resource cost.
A comparison of the welfare level attained when all risk
neutral firms smuggle to the welfare level achieved when all
firms engage in strictly legal trade can be determined by
answering two questions: l}

what effect does smuggling have on

the domestic price ratio; and 2} is the total social value of
exported goods smuggled cs*} greater than the total social value
of those exports if (S) were shipped through legal channels?

The

first question is answered by statements (14) through (16},
smuggling will only occur if expected smuggling revenue is
greater than or equal to legal trade revenue, which implies
(P*�pL) .

The second question can be answered by first assuming

(P*>PL) , then by rearranging statement {13},

p f.g*. (1-p•F) -

1r* -

Pf•S• (1-t) > 0. 11

{18}

If {P*>PL}, then (18} states that the smuggling firm receives a
higher total value for its exports by engaging in illegal trade.
The firm, however, does not consider the {DWL} to society
generated by the real resource cost associated with smuggling.

For smuggling to increase the total social value of exports in
comparison to the strictly legal trade alternative, statement
(19) must be true,
11

{1r*=O) .

Note, when it is assumed that firms are risk neutral then
12

(19)
If statement (19} is true, then the change in total revenues
generated from smuggling over non-smuggling is greater than
(OWL), and the total social value of exports increases.
simplifying (19) we have (20),
(20)

P� (s*/S} > p f • (l-t) + pf · (p·F) + ff*/s.
In comparing (20) to decision criteria statement (15), it is
clear that (20} is the stronger condition.

Which indicates that

it is possible for firms to decide to engage in smuggling and
have the act of smuggling reduce the total social value of
exports.

If however, the per unit revenue of smuggling input is

greater than the combined per unit value of: l} the legal trade
revenue alternative for (S} ; and 2} expected punishment, then
smuggling increases the social value of exports. We can now
assert that statement (20} is a necessary and sufficient
condition for risk neutral firms to engage in smuggling and
increase the total social value of exports over the non-smuggling
alternative.
An analysis of the social welfare effect of smuggling,
however, must also consider the effect smuggling has on the
(DPR} . For this purpose an indirect utility function (V} is
introduced. It is assumed (V} can be used as a proxy for social
welfare.

Assume welfare is a function of the (DPR) and income

(Y} . It is assumed that an improvement (increase) in (DPR}
increases social welfare.

It is assumed that income is

positively related to the total social value of exports. The
13

total social value of exports includes both private and public
sector revenues generated by the export trade.

Assume all other

income sources are held constant and enforcement effort does not
incur a real resource cost.

Under these assumptions the

following indirect utility function is defined as V (OPR, Y), and
has the following properties; oV/oOPR>O, oV/oY>0. 12
If statement (15) is true then firms will smuggle. If
condition (20) is also satisfied, then the welfare effect will be
positive.

This is due to the fact that the change in domestic

price ratio and the change in the total social value of exports
are both positive, and welfare improves via the social welfare
function (V).

The welfare effect of smuggling, however, is

ambiguous if condition (20) is not met. This ambiguous result is
the outcome of the (OPR) still increasing, but (Y) declining.
This set of results establishes that the ambiguous welfare
results obtained by Bhagwati and Hansen and Pitt can only occur
when smuggling incurs an excessive real resource cost.

Unlike

their analysis, however, this paper provides the mathematical
condition necessary for the ambiguous welfare result to occur,
otherwise smuggling has an unambiguous positive welfare effect.

12

The indirect utility function (V) has the following
properties: 1) (V) is continuous at all OPR>O, and Y>O; 2) (V) is
non-decreasing in (OPR) and (Y); and 3) (V) is homogenous of degree
zero in (DPR) and (Y). It should be noted that an increase in the
(OPR) implies an improvement in domestic relative prices. For a
discussion of the properties of the indirect utility function see
Varian (1984).
14

Smuggling coexisting with strictly legal trade can occur
when (P*=PL). If smuggling is coexisting with strictly legal
trade, then the change in the domestic price ratio is zero and
the change in the total social value of exports is negative as
(19) indicates since (Pf•S*• (- 1-p•F) - pt .5. (1-t)=O). In this

situation (16), smuggling either ends or the welfare effect is
negative. However, in this case the existence of strictly legal
trade and/or smuggling is indeterminate.

This result mirrors

that attained by Bhagwati and Hansen when (P*=PL), and their
conclusion of "the less smuggling the better" holds.
If it is assumed that the real resource cost of smuggling is
insignificant (S*/s�1), with penalties and confiscation
representing the significant cost to the smuggling firm, then
Pitt's strictly positive welfare result is reproduced in this
model. 13 Statements (13) and (15) indicate that the firm will
smuggle only if export revenue earned from smuggling is greater
than export revenue from strictly legal trade, in this case the
welfare effect is strictly positive.

Statement (16) expresses

that legal-trade-only firms (S=O) may coexist with firms that
smuggle (joint product) only when the value of expected
punishment equals the export tax, which implies the export price
received from both types of trade are equal.

If smuggling exists

in this situation, then the welfare effect is neutral. This

This is a strong assumption for this model, and is made only
to discuss Pitt's results under this assumption within the context
of this model.
13

15

situation allows both types of firm activity to coexist in the
Pitt framework.
The implications of these results are: 1) if the expected
punishment associated with smuggling is less than the export tax,
all firms smuggle; 2) without a significant real resource cost
associated with smuggling, the welfare level for the "all firms
smuggling" situation is greater than the non-smuggling
alternative due to smuggling's relative price effect; and 3) the
welfare effect of smuggling is dependent on the level of expected
punishment (p• F) •14
In the previous example of a risk neutral firm not incurring
a real resource cost, it was demonstrated that the firm was
indifferent in the choice between strictly legal trade or
smuggling when (t = p •F) .

For this specific case the actual

profit differential (ff) is equal to zero, and the risk premium
(ff*) required by the risk neutral firm is equal to zero. The risk
averse firm, however, requires (ff�ff*) to engage in smuggling.
suppose for example, that the actual risk premium being generated
when a firm smuggles (S*) in lieu of exporting (S) through legal
channels is equal to:
(21)

For the risk averse firm (ff*) is positive. If (ff) is greater than
(ff*) , then the firm will smuggle as indicated by statement (15) .
14 Without a significant real resource cost to smuggling, the
cost of smuggling to the firm represents just a transfer of revenue
to the government. The aggregate rate of transformation in trade in
this situation is the free trade terms of trade as in Pitt's paper.

16

The effect of smuggling on social welfare depends on if the risk
premium earned by smugglers is greater than the (OWL) associated
with smuggling. In comparing (20) to decision criteria statement
(15), it is clear that it is possible for firms to decide to
engage in smuggling and have the act of smuggling reduce the
total social value of exports.

If, however, the per unit revenue

of smuggling input is greater than the combined per unit value
of: 1) the legal trade revenue alternative for (S); 2) expected
punishment; and 3) the risk premium, then smuggling increases the
social value of exports. We can now assert that statement (20) is
a necessary and sufficient condition for risk averse firms to
engage in smuggling and increase the total social value of
exports over the non-smuggling alternative.
If condition (20) holds, the welfare effect of smuggling by
risk averse firms is positive. This result occurs because both
the (DPR) and (Y) increase.

Income increases because the total

social value of exports in the presence of smuggling is greater
than the non-smuggling alternative.

If (20) is not true, then

the welfare effect of smuggling is ambiguous. The results of the
risk averse case mirror the risk neutral case.
The next welfare issue to be addressed is when smuggling and
strictly legal trade coexist.

This situation is stated in (16).

The coexistence of the two types of trade can only occur when if
[P* = pL+ff*/ (L+S)].

This implies that the law of one price breaks

down and allows a type of parallel market structure to develop.
The (DPR) is now composed of a weighted average of (P*) and (PL).
17

The effect on the total social value of exports for this
case is again determined by (20) . Condition (20) reveals that the
total social value of exports, if firms smuggle, is less than the
total social value of exports for the legal trade alternative.
The welfare result for this case is ambiguous: The (DPR)
increases and income declines and therefore the welfare effect of
smuggling is ambiguous when smuggling coexists with strictly
legal trade.

This result implies the "less smuggling the better"

result of Bhagwati and Hansen does not hold when firms are risk
averse.
The next issue to be addressed is the effect of increased
enforcement on smuggling and welfare.

starting with the

assumptions that there is not a significant real resource cost
associated with smuggling and firms are risk neutral, increased
enforcement will have a negative effect on the (DPR) if (p•F <
t) , and eliminate smuggling when the level of expected punishment
becomes greater than the export tax. Equation (8) and condition
(12) verify the last statement: 1) if enforcement is increased,
then (P*) declines as equation (8) indicates; and 2) if the value
of (P*) declines below (P1 ), then condition (12) states that all
smuggling will end. Under the "no real cost" assumption,
increased enforcement has a negative impact on welfare due to its
negative effect of the (DPR) .
Relaxing the "no real cost" assumption, the welfare effect
of smuggling is shown to be either ambiguous or strictly
positive.

The welfare result is dependent on the real resource
18

cost, the value of expected punishment and the risk premium
(ff*=O) . The welfare effect of increased enforcement is ambiguous
(negative) if the welfare effect of smuggling is ambiguous
(positive) .
Relaxing the assumption of risk neutrality, for the risk
averse case, when smuggling has a positive (ambiguous) impact on
welfare, the welfare effect of increased enforcement is negative
(ambiguous) .
The next issue to be discussed is the results contained in a
paper by Sheikh (1989) .

Sheikh argues that the ambiguous welfare

results derived in the earlier literature are the direct result
of smugglers being risk preferring. This paper's model
demonstrates that it is the assumption on the magnitude of the
real resource cost that generates the ambiguous welfare result.
Sheikh also asserts that incorporating risk by itself lowers
welfare and thus all previous models over-predict the positive
impact of smuggling on welfare. This assertion is only true when
firms are risk averse. However, it is not the inclusion of risk,
but the assumption of risk aversion that lowers welfare. This
point is discussed next.
The final issue to be discussed is the long run equilibrium
results of the model.

This paper examined two firm risk

preference states: l) risk averse firms; and 2) risk neutral
firms.

The results of the model demonstrate that long run

equilibrium profit and (DPR) are effected by the state of nature
assumed about firm risk preference.
19

In the risk neutral case,

long run economic profit is equal to zero.

The long run domestic

price ratio is composed of a weighted average of (P8) and (pL).
Under the assumption of firm risk aversion, long run economic
profit is positive.

However, it is assumed that (�*) represents

compensation for the mental anguish suffered by firms due to the
risk associated with smuggling.

Thus, excessive profit in the

non-competitive sense is not being earned.

Comparing the two

states, the long run equilibrium (DPR) is lower for the risk
averse state.

The risk averse state, therefore, reduces welfare

when compared to the risk neutral state. However, under both
states of nature it is possible for smuggling to have a strictly
positive effect on welfare.

The state of nature effect in this

model is consistent with the trade literature on uncertainty. 15

v.

summary.
A general equilibrium joint product model of smuggling

incorporating features found in the papers by Bhagwati and
Hansen, and Pitt was presented in this paper.

The results of the

paper indicate that: 1) smuggling can have a strictly positive
welfare effect over the legal trade alternative; 2) firms that
smuggle can coexist with firms that engage in strictly legal
trade and if firms are risk averse the welfare effect of
smuggling is ambiguous; 3)

increased enforcement against

smuggling can have a negative welfare effect; and 4) the real

For a discussion of the effect of uncertainty on prices,
output, and welfare see Batra (1975) .
15
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resource cost, expected punishment, and firm risk preference all
play a role in determining the welfare effect of smuggling.
VI. Appendix (A).
The profit maximization first order conditions for equation
(7)

are,

aY/aL

= (1-p•F)•Pf•GL + pf . (1-t) - p* = o,

aY/as = (1-p•F)•Pf•Gs - p* = O.

(la)
(2a)

The term (Pf), is the fixed international terms of trade and
(t) is the ad valorem export tax rate.

First order conditions

(la) and (2a) state that the marginal cost of an additional unit
of tradeable will just equal its revenue in trade, be it legal or
illegal trade.

An additional unit of legal trade will result in

additional legal revenue Pf• (l-t) and additional smuggling reve
nue (1-p•F)•Pf•GL.
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